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Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International: The
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance

Corporation's Authority to Adjudicate
Creditor Claims Against Its
Receiverships
The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), a division of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), insures depositor accounts in savings and loan associations.' The FSLIC's role as insurer involves both regulating the financial health of insured institutions to prevent
default and paying deposit insurance when it cannot prevent
default. 2 If an insured institution does fail, the FHLBB may
appoint the FSLIC receiver of the failed institution under certain circumstances. 3 In its role as receiver, as distinguished
from its role as insurer, the FSLIC assumes control of the
failed institution, liquidating the institution's assets when the
FSLIC cannot sell the institution or restore it to a profitable
4
condition.
When the FSLIC liquidates an institution, it evaluates the
claims of the institution's creditors and pays those it deems
valid.5 Creditors whose claims are disputed by a receiver traditionally may bring suit in court to establish the validity of their
claims. 6 Recently, however, the FSLIC began asserting the
1. See 12 U.S.C. § 1725(a) (1982). Congress created the FSLIC in 1934 as
a counterpart to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), instituted
in 1933 to insure banks. See T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HoME LoAN BANK
BOARD 27-28 (1969). In structure, however, the FSLIC, a division of the
FHLBB, differs from the FDIC, an independent agency. See id. at 85.
2. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1726(b) (1982) (providing that institutions applying for FSLIC insurance must agree to periodic examinations by FSLIC); id.
§ 1730(b) (providing for termination of institution's insurance by FSLIC under
certain conditions).
3. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. The FSLIC works hard to
prevent liquidating institutions. In 1986, for example, the FSLIC assisted in
the sale of 27 troubled institutions, inducted 23 institutions into its Management Consignment Program, transferred accounts from 11 institutions to various new institutions, and liquidated 10 institutions, only two of which required
cash payouts. See FHLBB ANN. REP. 27 (1986).
5. See infra notes 35, 37-42 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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right to adjudicate disputed creditor claims itself, denying credithem
tors their traditional access to the courts 7 and prompting
8
to challenge the FSLIC's authority for such actions.
In a recent case addressing the FSLIC's authority to adjudicate creditor claims, a borrower sued Gibralter Savings of
Washington (Gibralter) in an Oregon state court to have the
court declare his repayment obligation void.9 Gibralter impleaded Westside Federal Savings and Loan Association (Westside) as guarantor on the loan and removed the case to federal
court.10 Meanwhile, Westside became insolvent and the
FHLBB appointed the FSLIC receiver for Westside. 11 After
the receivership appointment, the court substituted the FSLIC
for Westside as a party in the pending suit.' 2 The FSLIC
moved to dismiss Gibralter's third-party claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging the FSLIC had exclusive authority to adjudicate creditor claims against its receiverships.J 3
7. See inkfra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 50.
9. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, 811 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.
1987).
10. Id. at 1213.
11. Id. The FHLBB appointed the FSLIC receiver pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982), which provides in relevant part:
The grounds for the appointment of a... receiver for an association shall be one or more of the following: ... insolvency in that the
assets of the association are less than its obligations to its creditors
The [FHLBB] shall have exand others, including its members ....
clusive power and jurisdiction to appoint a ... receiver. If, in the
opinion of the [FHLBB], a ground for the appointment of a ... receiver as herein provided exists, the [FHLBB] is authorized to appoint
ex parte and without notice a... receiver for the association.
Id.
12. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1213. The appointment of a receiver
does not affect pending suits, but courts may, upon the receiver's application,
substitute the receiver for the insolvent institution. See, e.g., Hardman v.
Whitney, 176 Okla. 142, 144, 54 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1936) (receivers not necessary
parties to suits pending against receivership property at time of appointment);
Garrett v. Nespelem Consol. Mines, 18 Wash. 2d 340, 345-46, 139 P.2d 273, 276
(1943) (court may substitute receiver as party in pending suit upon application
of receiver).
13. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1213. The FSLIC has no claim to sovereign immunity in such suits. Section 1729(c)(4) provides that the FSLIC
may "sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States." 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(4) (1982). Such statutes operate as congressional waivers of a federal agency's sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) (holding that "sue and be sued"
clause creates presumption that agency is as amenable to judicial process as
private enterprise in same situation); FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592
F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.) (finding that "sue and be sued" clause acts as waiver of
sovereign immunity for federal agencies), cert denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979).

1988] FSLIC ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS

861

The district court granted the motion.14 In Morrison-Knudsen
Co. v. CHG International,15 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that6
1
the FSLIC does not have power to adjudicate creditor claims.
Until the early 1980s, little controversy existed as to the
extent of the FSLIC's receivership powers. Only thirteen savings and loan failures before 1980 required FSLIC payouts to
depositors. 17 Recently, however, savings and loan associations
have been failing at an unprecedented rate.' 8 This trend
threatens the FSLIC's financial stability and pressures the
FSLIC to recoup its insurance payouts as rapidly as possible
through prompt liquidation of failed institutions' assets.19 To
achieve this goal, the FSLIC has interpreted the relevant statutes and regulations as granting it sole jurisdiction over the receivership process, including adjudication of creditor claims,
subject to review by the FHLBB. 20 Under the FSLIC's inter14. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1213. The district court opinion is reported at Rembold v. Gibralter Say. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 1006, 1007
(W.D. Wash. 1985). On appeal the Ninth Circuit consolidated the Gibralter
case and four other cases involving similar creditor claims against Westside. In
four of the five cases, the district courts had granted the FSLIC's motion to
dismiss the case. In the fifth case, the district court had denied the FSLIC's
motion, prompting the FSLIC to appeal the denial immediately without waiting for a final judgment. Id. The Morrison-Knudsen court, after a discussion
of legal principles irrelevant to this Comment, dismissed the appeal in the
fifth case because the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss was not
an appealable interlocutory order. Id. at 1214-15. The court also dismissed one
of the other appealed cases because the original plaintiffs failed to appeal and
a defendant who had cross-claimed against the FSLIC brought the appeal.
The court stated that "[lt is hornbook law that 'a party may only appeal to
protect its own interests, and not those of a coparty.'" Id. at 1214 (quoting
Libby, McNeill, & Libby v. City Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 511 (9th Cir. 1978)).
15. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
16. Id. at 1222.
17.

Grant, The FSLIC, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 9, 9 (Feb. 1981),

cited in Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216.
18. In 1986, for example, the FSLIC ended the year with 183 defaulted institutions in its caseload compared with 91 such cases at the end of 1985.
FHLBB ANN. REP. 27 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Carrizosa, Appeal Court Cuts Agency's Powers Over Debt
Payouts: Circuits Split on Issue, 100 L.A. Daily J., Feb. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 2
(FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims speeds up reimbursement of insurance
fund).
20. See infra notes 25-44 and accompanying text. For an early case in
which the FHLBB maintained the right to adjudicate creditor claims, see First
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251 (D. Haw.
1981). The court dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to name the
FHLBB as a party, but the court noted in dicta that the FHLBB's position
does not deny all judicial review of creditor claims because review is still available under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 254.
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pretation, courts have jurisdiction only to review the FSLIC's
adjudication of claims under the deferential standards of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).21 The two other circuits
besides the Ninth Circuit to rule on the issue adopted the
FSLIC's position, and numerous district courts have followed
22
suit.
This Comment considers whether the FSLIC has or should
have the right to adjudicate creditor claims against its receiverships. Part I briefly discusses the relevant statutes and regulations governing the FSLIC's receivership powers, preMorrison-Knudsencases interpreting the extent of the FSLIC's
powers, and the restrictions on administrative agency adjudication imposed by article III of the Constitution. Part II examines the Ninth Circuit's decision in Morrison-Knudsen that the
FSLIC does not have the power to adjudicate creditor claims.
Part III analyzes the relevant statutes and regulations, the statutory scheme, constitutional issues, and the policy considerations not addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Morrison-Knudsen.
The Comment concludes that although the Ninth Circuit correctly decided Morrison-Knudsen, Congress should pass new
legislation regulating creditor claims in FSLIC receiverships to
protect both creditors and the FSLIC.
I.

A.

FSLIC RECEIVERSHIP POWERS

STATUTORY RECEIVERSHIP POWERS

Courts with jurisdiction over an insolvent institution generally appoint a receiver to liquidate the institution's assets.2
The receiver, as representative of the court, acts under the
court's direction and obtains its powers only from the court or
24
applicable statutes.
21. The APA provides different standards of review for general agency
action and agency hearings specifically provided for by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1982). The standard for general agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion." Id. § 706(2)(A). Agency hearings, in contrast, receive the
less deferential standard of "unsupported by substantial evidence." Id.
§ 706(2)(E). Because hearings on creditor claims are not explicitly provided
for in the statute, the arbitrary and capricious standard would probably apply.
See Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1222.
22. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Drexler v. Walters, 290 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D. Minn. 1968) (receivers subject to control of appointing court).
24. See, e.g., Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 322 U.S. 408, 413 (1944) (receiver's duties limited to those conferred by court); Taylor v. Sternberg, 293
U.S. 470, 472 (1935) (receiver is officer of appointing court); Parcells v. Price,
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In handling creditor claims against an insolvent institution,
a court-appointed receiver normally has the power to make a
preliminary determination as to what claims the court should
allow. 2 5 If the receiver disallows a claim, the applicable statute2 6 provides for appeal to the court that appointed the receiver, resulting in a trial on the merits of the claim.27 Once
the receiver has settled and prioritized all creditor claims, the
court issues an order permitting distribution of the receivership
28
assets.

In addition to allowing state courts to appoint the FSLIC
receiver for defaulted state savings and loan associations, 29 Congress granted the FHLBB the power to appoint the FSLIC receiver in certain enumerated situations for both defaulted
federal 30 and state associations. 31 Furthermore, if the defaulted
110 Mont. 537, 540, 104 P.2d 12, 13 (1940) (receiver's powers limited to those
conferred by court or statute).
25. In making this determination, the receiver can conduct hearings, including the examination of claimants and witnesses, and require the production of documents. See, e.g., Jacobs, Receivership Practice in the Delaware
Courts, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 487, 499 (1981) (describing receivership practice

under Delaware law); Wyatt, State Court Receiverships in North Carolina,17
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 756 (1981) (describing receivership practice under

North Carolina law).
26. Receivership practice is typically governed by state statutes. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 131, 1709 (1985) (governing Delaware receivership
practice for banks and building and loan associations).
27. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 25, at 499; Wyatt, supra note 25, at 756.
28. Wyatt, supra note 25, at 761.
29. When the grounds for FHLBB appointment of the FSLIC as receiver
of a defaulted state association are not present, the FHLBB may offer the receivership services of the FSLIC to the state court having jurisdiction over the
defaulted state savings and loan association. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(1) (1982). The
state, however, is under no obligation to accept the FSLIC as receiver. In fact,
most state courts prefer to appoint their own receivers. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 1709 (1985) (providing for appointment of State Bank Commissioner as receiver for failed building and loan associations). Congress originally passed § 1729(c)(2), which allows the FHLBB to appoint the FSLIC
receiver of state associations in certain situations, in response to a severe financial drain on the FSLIC caused by the slow progress of several simultaneous state court receiverships. See T. MARVELL, supra note 1, at 105. It is
important to distinguish between FSLIC receiverships in which the FHLBB
appointed the FSLIC and those in which a state authority appointed the
FSLIC because § 1729(d) specifically reserves regulatory authority over the receivership to state authorities that appoint the FSLIC receiver. See infra note
36.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982). These situations include insolvency;
"substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to any violation... of law,
rules, or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound practice;" .unsafe or unsound conditions to transact business;" "willful violation of a cease-and-desist
order which has become final;" and concealment of certain association records
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association does not challenge the receivership within thirty
days, 32 section 1464(d)(6)(C) of title 12 in the United States
courts to interCode, the "restrain or affect" provision, forbids
33
fere with the FSLIC's receivership functions.
When either the FHLBB or a state authority appoints the
FSLIC receiver of a defaulted thrift institution, section
1729(b)(1) of title 12 in the United States Code, the "payment"
provision, authorizes the FSLIC to take a variety of actions, including merging the association with another institution, organizing a new institution to assume its assets, or liquidating
or refusal to submit such records to the FHLBB. Id. The FHLBB appointed
the FSLIC receiver for Westside pursuant to this statute. See supra note 11.
31. The FHLBB may appoint the FSLIC receiver of a state-chartered institution when the grounds for appointment of a federal receiver under
§ 1464(d)(6)(A) exist, see supra note 30, when the appropriate authority has
appointed a receiver whose appointment has been outstanding for at least 15
days, and when a holder of a withdrawable account is unable to obtain a withdrawal. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(2) (1982).
In 1982 Congress further strengthened the power of the FHLBB over
state savings and loan associations by adding a new subsection to § 1729(c)
which gives the FHLBB the power to immediately appoint the FSLIC receiver
of a failed state institution whenever any of the grounds specified in
§ 1464(d)(6)(A)(i), (ii), or (iii) exists. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 122(d), (f), 96 Stat. 1482 (1982) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1729) (DIA). Congress also amended § 1729(c)(3) to extend the
application of § 1464(d), see supra note 30 and accompanying text; infra notes
32-33 and accompanying text, to all FSLIC receiverships, even when a state
court appoints the FSLIC as receiver. The Senate Report interpreting the
DIA described § 122 as "provid[ing] the FSLIC with ... receivership powers
over State-Chartered insured institutions approximately equal to those which
it now has with respect to Federal Associations." S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 3054, 3102.
The provisions of the DIA expired on October 13, 1986. See Act of Oct. 8, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-452, § 1(c), 100 Stat. 1140 (1986) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. IV 1987)). Nevertheless, an amendment to the DIA provided that "[t]he repeal.., shall have no effect on any action taken or authorized pursuant to the amendments made by this title." Act of Jan. 12, 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-457, § 11, 96 Stat. 2507, 2508 (1983) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. IV (1987)). For this reason most of the cases cited in this
Comment, including the principal case, were decided under the amendments
made by the DIA. On August 10, 1987, Congress reinstated the provisions of
the DIA when it passed the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-86, § 509, 101 Stat. 552, 635 (1987) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982) permits an association to challenge
the appointment of a receiver in federal district court, provided the association
files suit within 30 days of such appointment.
33. Id. § 1464(d)(6)(C). "Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any ...receiver, or,
except at the instance of the Board, restrainor affect the exercise of powers or
functions of a ...receiver." Id. (emphasis added).
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the association.3 The payment provision further directs the
FSLIC to "pay all valid credit obligations of the association." 35
In addition, when the FSLIC liquidates an insured institution,
section 1729(d), the "necessary action" provision, authorizes the
FSLIC to settle claims made against the receivership and do all
other things necessary to the liquidation, subject to the control
36
of the FHLBB or the appropriate public authority.
To supplement the FSLIC's statutory authority, the
FHLBB has promulgated regulations governing the FSLIC's
handling of creditor claims in receiverships. 37 The regulations
require notice to possible claimants and a deadline for the filing
of claims. 38 When creditors file claims, the FSLIC, as the receiver, examines the claims, allowing claims received before the
deadline that claimants prove to the FSLIC's satisfaction. 39
The FSLIC may disallow any claims not so proved.40 The regu41
lations do not dictate procedures for the evaluation of claims,
but they do provide that disallowance is final unless the claimant protests in writing within thirty days.4 After the deadline
for submitting claims has passed, the FSLIC files with the
34. Id. § 1729(b)(1)(A). The statute leaves the choice of actions to the
FSLIC's discretion, stating "whichever it deems to be in the best interest of
the association, its savers, and the [FSLIC]." Id.
35. Id. § 1729(b)(1)(B).
36. Id. § 1729(d). The statute authorizes the FSLIC
to settle, compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions, and to do all other things that may be necessary in
connection therewith, subject only to the regulation of the [FHLBB],
or, in cases where the [FSLIC] has been appointed. . .receiver...
solely by a public authority having jurisdiction over the matter other
than [the FHLBB], subject only to the regulation of such public
authority.
Id.
37. See 12 C.F.R. § 549.4 (1987) (governing creditor claims when the
FSLIC acts as receiver for federal associations); id. § 569a.8 (governing creditor
claims when the FSLIC acts as receiver for state associations). Because the
regulations governing state and federal associations are similar, this Comment
will discuss and quote the federal association regulations but will note any significant differences between the two sets of regulations.
38. Id. § 549.4(a). The regulation provides for both notice by publication
and notice by mail to creditors on the books of the institution. The length of
time allowed for the submission of claims is left to the FSLIC's discretion, but
the deadline must be at least 90 days after the notice is first published. Id.
39. Id. § 549.4(b) ("The receiver shall allow any claims seasonably received and proved to its satisfaction.").
40. Id. ("The receiver may wholly or partly disallow any creditor claim...
not so proved .....

41. Id.
42. Id. "Unless, within 30 days after notice is mailed, the claimant files a
written request for payment ... disallowance shall be final.... ." The regula-
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FHLBB a list of claims together with its decision on the
claims, 43 and then pays the allowed claims as directed by the
FHLBB."
B. COURT

DECISIONS ON THE

FSLIC's ADJUDICATORY POWER

The FSLIC asserts that the relevant statutes and regulations grant it exclusive authority to adjudicate creditor claims
against its receiverships, denying district courts subject matter
jurisdiction over such claims. 45 In 1985 the Fifth Circuit, in
North Mississippi Savings & Loan v. Hudspeth,46 adopted the
FSLIC's interpretation, holding that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate creditor claims against the FSLIC except for review under the APA.47 Avoiding the threshold issue
of whether adjudication of creditor claims is a receivership
function, the Hudspeth court asserted that judicial adjudication
of such claims would delay the distribution of assets, which is
clearly a receivership function. 48 The court noted, however,
that FHLBB regulations "are evidence that adjudication is a receivership function." 49 The Seventh Circuit and various district
courts have followed Hudspeth, dismissing creditor claims
against FSLIC receiverships for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.5 0
tions governing state associations do not contain this provision. See id.
§ 569a.8.

43. Id. § 549.4(c). The FSLIC files a "list of claims presented, indicating
the character of each claim and whether allowed by the receiver." Id.
44. Id. § 549.4(d). "Creditor claims which were allowed by the receiver...
shall be paid by the receiver.., in such manner and amounts as the [FHLBB]
may direct." Id. The regulations governing state associations do not contain
this provision. See id. § 569a.8.
45. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
46. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
47. The court conducted a cursory examination of the relevant statutes
and regulations, focusing on the prohibition against restraining or affecting the
FSLIC's receivership functions in 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). The court
concluded:
[Riesolution of even the facial merits of claims outside of the statutory reorganization process would delay the receivership function of
distribution of assets: the FSLIC would not be able to determine how
much to pay other claimants until the termination of the parallel litigation. Given the overriding Congressional purpose of expediting and
facilitating the FSLIC's task as receiver, such a delay is a "restraint"
within the scope of the statute.
Id. at 1102.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1102 n.5 (emphasis in original).
50. The Seventh Circuit followed Hudspeth in Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Westside Bancorp., 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs in Lyons sought
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Courts supporting the FSLIC's position emphasize the
FSLIC's financial predicament and the need to maintain public
confidence in the savings and loan industry.5 1 These courts find
reflected in the statutes an overriding congressional intent of
allowing the FSLIC to recoup its insurance payouts rapidly.5 2
Furthermore, some courts have declared that the plain meaning of the relevant statutes supports the FSLIC's interpretadeclaratory judgment against the FSLIC as receiver for a defaulted institution
that had served as lead lender in a finance agreement with the plaintiffs, other
savings and loan associations. Id. at 388. The plaintiffs asserted the right to
strip the failed institution of its lead lender status by election among themselves. Id. The court noted the conflict between the circuits over the issue of
FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims but declined to decide whether or not
the adjudication of claims is a receivership function for the FSLIC. Id. at 392.
Apparently the parties failed to challenge the authority of the FSLIC to adjudicate claims but rather asserted that adjudication of their claim would not restrain or affect the receivership within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 391.
Assuming that the FSLIC was empowered to adjudicate claims, the court held
that a determination to strip the FSLIC receivership of lead lender status
would restrain or affect the FSLIC based on Hudspeth's broad interpretation
of the phrase. Id. at 394-95.
Several district courts have followed Hudspeth's holding. See, e.g., Acquisition Corp. v. Sunrise Say. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138, 140 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(reasoning in Hudspeth persuasive); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Utah 1987) (statutory scheme supports Hudspeth's interpretation); First Fin. Say. & Loan v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins.
Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (overwhelming majority of
courts follow Hudspeth).
51. "The FSLIC's primary responsibility is to guarantee FSLIC-insured
deposits, and to do so in a way that bolsters public confidence in America's financial institutions." FHLBB ANN. REP. 25 (1986). There is no doubt that the
FSLIC is in an unstable condition which undermines public confidence in the
thrift industry. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. The FSLIC's
primary reserve fund is under severe stress. The high rate of savings and loan
failures has forced the FSLIC to use large amounts of its reserve fund's cash
to pay insured depositors in liquidated institutions. FHLBB ANN. REP. 25
(1986). A recent article advised investors concerned about protecting their investment to deposit their money in institutions insured by the FDIC rather
than the FSLIC because of the depleted condition of the FSLIC's reserves,
thereby implying that the FSLIC might default on its insurance obligations.
Anderson & Binstein, Is Your DepositSafe?, Parade, Sept. 20, 1987, at 15. In
response to this crisis, Congress passed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Recapitalization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 302, 101
Stat. 552, 585 (1987) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441), which supplements
FSLIC reserves. The bill establishes a Financing Corporation which is authorized to raise capital for the FSLIC by the sale of bonds. The FSLIC began
marketing the bonds in September of 1987. See Yang, S & Ls Operated by
FSLIC Incur Large Losses, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1987, at 23, col. 1.
52. See, e.g., Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102 (Congress intended to expedite
liquidation of FSLIC receiverships); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hall
Whispertree Assocs., 653 F. Supp. 148, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (Congress intended
to provide for expedient relief to FSLIC through statutory scheme).
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agency
afforded
deference
traditional
The
tion.53
interpretations- 4 further persuades the courts to accept the
55
FSLIC's position.
C.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY ADJUDICATION

In addition to statutory regulation of the FSLIC's asserted
adjudicative authority, the Constitution regulates the FSLIC's
authority to adjudicate. Article III vests the judicial power of
the United States in courts staffed by judges possessing life tenure and irreducible compensation. 56 Although the Supreme
Court has not interpreted article III as an absolute bar to adjudication by non-article III courts, 57 it has not established any
53. See, e.g., Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Mont. 1987). The
court in Kohlbeck stated that "[the plain language of the applicable statutes
precludes federal court jurisdiction over claims against the receiver until the
administrative procedure is complete. The courts adhere to and enforce the
plain meaning of the statutes." Id.
54. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974) (longstanding administrative construction is entitled to great weight); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971) ("[Clourts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with
the enforcement of that statute."); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)
("[Tihis Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by
the officers or agency charged with its administration.").
55. See Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103 (FHLBB's opinion entitled to deference); York Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 663 F. Supp.
1100, 1104 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (same); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Utah 1987) (FHLBB regulations set up adjudicatory process for FSLIC and are entitled to deference).
56. Article III provides: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682 (1980) (magistrate
determinations subject to de novo review by district court constitutional);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (administrative fact finding in adjudicating congressionally created rights constitutional). Nevertheless, in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that the legislative bankruptcy scheme, which gave
nonarticle III courts jurisdiction over all actions related to bankruptcy proceedings, violated article III. Id. at 76. Congress established a United States
bankruptcy court for each judicial district in 1978. The bankruptcy court
judges were appointed for 14-year terms, subject to removal for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or . .. disability." Id. at 61. The judges'
salaries were set by Congress, subject to adjustment. Id. The bankruptcy
courts exercised all the powers of the district courts and issued binding, enforceable judgments subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.
Id. at 85-86. The Court found the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts unconstitutional based on the constitutional system of checks and bal-
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bright line rules to determine when an adjudicatory grant to an
administrative agency or non-article III court is constitutional. 58 Instead, the Court has emphasized protecting the integrity of the judicial branch,59 examining a variety of factors
to
60
determine the degree of intrusion into the judicial process.

One factor the Court considers in article III analysis is the
origin of adjudicated rights, which entails a distinction between
public and private rights. 61 Public rights disputes arise between
ances which requires an impartial judiciary free from legislative or executive
control. Id. at 59-60.
58. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245,
3261 (1986) ("[Blright line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad
principles applicable in all Article III inquiries.").
59. See id. at 3258 (underlying issue is "the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal
judiciary").
60. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985), which involved an arbitration scheme established by Congress under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1982)). The Act required manufacturers of pesticides to register their products with the Environmental Protection Agency but allowed the manufacturers to use the data presented by other manufacturers of the same chemicals in
filing their claims. The Act provided for an independent arbitrator to determine the amount of compensation that manufacturers using such data should
pay the submitting manufacturers. The Court noted a variety of factors in determining that the arbitration scheme did not impermissibly intrude on the
function of the judiciary. To begin with, the Court determined that the right
involved '%ears many of the characteristics of a 'public' right." Id. at 589. The
Court noted that the Act created the right to compensation and did not depend
on such a right under state law. Id. at 584. In addition, the Court reasoned
that the claimants had extinguished their trade secret rights under state law
by disclosing them to the federal agency. Id. The Court also considered the
necessity of a prompt and inexpensive method of determining compensation to
avoid delays in registration of pesticides. Id. at 590. Furthermore, the Court
noted that the arbitration scheme contained its own sanctions and did not rely
on the enforcement mechanisms of the judiciary. Id. at 591. Finally, the Court
commented that judicial review, available to review the arbitrator's findings
for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation, provided an "appropriate exercise
of the judicial function" in the situation. Id. at 592 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932)).
In Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3245, the statutory scheme at issue involved a grant
of authority over counterclaims to an administrative agency. The counterclaims were based on state law, but the Court refused to invalidate the scheme
because claimants could choose to bring their counterclaims either in the administrative proceeding or in court. Id. at 3260. Congress granted the agency
the right to adjudicate counterclaims in the interest of efficiency, stated the
Court, and the "magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be
termed de minimus." Id. (emphasis in original).
61. See Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258. Northern Pipeline distinguishes three judicially recognized exceptions to the article III rule: military courts, courts
governing territorial areas not controlled by state courts, and adjudication involving public rather than private rights. 458 U.S. at 64-70. The territorial ex-
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the federal government and individuals in connection with the
exercise of governmental power.62 Administrative agencies
may freely adjudicate public rights. 63 Private rights disputes
arise between individuals. 64 Normally, administrative agencies
may not adjudicate private rights unless an article III court retains the right of de novo review.65 When the private rights are
created by Congress, however, a standard of review by an article III court more deferential than the de novo standard is conis less
stitutionally acceptable, provided the standard
66
deferential than the clearly erroneous standard.
ception applies to situations in which no state operates as sovereign and
Congress exercises the general powers of government. Id. at 64. An example
of this exception is the non-article III courts with jurisdiction over the District
of Columbia. Id. at 65. The Northern Pipeline Court noted that "the distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents." Id. at 69.
62. The Northern Pipeline Court stated "that a matter of public rights
must at a minimum arise 'between the government and others."' 458 U.S. at
69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1928)). For a further
elaboration of the public rights distinction, see Note, Constitutional
Law-Article III. A Clear Test for the Constitutionality of Non-Article III
Courts: Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 18
LAND & WATER L. REV. 313, 322-24 (1983). In interpreting Northern Pipeline,
the Note states that "the public rights exception extends to matters which
(1) arise between the government and persons subject to the constitutional exercise of its legislative or executive authority, (2) historically have been determined by the executive and legislative branches of the government, and
(3) are not private rights disputes." Id. at 324.
63. See supra note 61.
64. See Note, supra note 62, at 324. The Note comments that "[p]rivate
rights disputes involve 'the liability of one individual to another under the law
as defined' and may not be removed from the cognizance of article III courts."
Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). The reason for the
Court's distinction between public and private rights lies in the nature of private rights claims, many of which are based on state law derived from traditional common law. "[Alt the time the Constitution was written, common law
disputes constituted the heart of the English judiciary's work, making it reasonable to conclude that the framers referred to such traditional judicial activity when they employed the term 'judicial power' and vested that 'judicial
power' in the article III judiciary." Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 211.
65. See Rebel, Legislative and Administrative Courts: Northern Pipeline
and Related Developments in Federal ConstitutionalLaw, 5 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5, 10-11 (1985). Rehel comments that the Northern Pipeline
Court identified two subclasses of private rights that require differing degrees
of judicial power to be retained by article III courts. Id. at 10. With respect to
the private common law rights subclass, any adjudication by administrative
agencies "must be subject to de novo review by the district court." Id. at 11
(emphasis in original).
66. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
589 (1985) (commenting that a right created by federal government as part of
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Another factor, the amount of judicial power reserved to
article III courts, involves the extent to which the administrative agency usurps traditional judicial functions. 67 The considerations that prompted Congress to create the legislative
adjudication scheme provide a further factor in determining the
constitutionality of agency adjudication. 68 A strong need for efficient agency adjudication can help
establish the constitution69
ality of the adjudicatory scheme.
II. THE MORRISON-KNUDSEN DECISION
The Ninth Circuit in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International°became the first circuit to narrowly interpret the receivership statute and hold that the FSLIC does not have the
authority to adjudicate creditor claims. 71 Examining first the
restrain or affect provision of section 1464(d)(6)(C), 72 the court
concluded that the provision does not grant the FSLIC the
regulatory scheme "bears many of the characteristics of a 'public' right"); see
also Rebel, supra note 65, at 11. Rebel observes that with respect to congressionally created private rights, administrative agencies can adjudicate specialized matters and issue binding orders as long as an article HI court retains a
right of review less deferential than the clearly erroneous standard. Id.
67. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245,
3258 (1986). In Schor, the Court refused to invalidate the agency adjudication
scheme because claimants could choose to bring their claims in either the
agency adjudication or federal district court. Id.; see also supra note 60.
68. See Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258.
69. In Thomas, for example, the Court refused to invalidate agency adjudication of pesticide data claims designed to avoid delay in registration of pesticides. 473 U.S. at 590.
70. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
71. See supra notes 46, 50 and accompanying text. The court acknowledged the FSLIC's current difficulties, noting that over "four hundred thrift
associations failed from 1981 to 1984." Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216 (citing Comment, The "BrokeredDeposit" Regulation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 594, 607
(1985)). In addition, the court noted that "[iun 1981 and 1982, FSLIC spent
more than four times what it had in the preceding forty-five years." Id. at
1216 (citing Chamberlain, Protecting America's Savings, FED. HOME LOAN
BANK BoARD J. 9, 9 (Feb. 1981)). Although the court shared the FSLIC's concern over its pressing financial difficulties, it observed that Congress passed
the statutes in question before the FSLIC's current problems. The court concluded that the policy issue, however pressing, could not empower the court to
revise the FSLIC's statutory authority. Id. In addition, the court commented
that the FSLIC did not assert a right to adjudicate claims until 1980, noting,
however, that this would not defeat the claim if the statute authorized the
claimed adjudicative powers. Id.
72. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The court observed that
this section provides the FSLIC's strongest argument for the authority to adjudicate creditor claims and that it was the FSLIC's interpretation of this section
that persuaded the court in Hudspeth. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216.
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power to adjudicate creditor claims but merely prohibits courts
from interfering with receivership powers already granted to
the FSLIC. 73 Traditional receivership functions do not include
adjudication. 74 Consequently, the court reasoned that the prohibition on court interference with the FSLIC's receivership
powers is inapplicable to creditor claims in the absence of the
authority to adjudicate such claims in the statutes, regulations,
75
or statutory scheme.
The court then examined the statutes, regulations, and
statutory scheme to determine whether Congress had indeed
granted the FSLIC the authority to adjudicate creditor claims.
Examining the payment provision in section 1729(b)(1), 76 and
the necessary action provision in section 1729(d), 77 the court
found that the FSLIC placed unreasonable emphasis on a single
word in each statute. 78 Regarding the payment provision, the
court stated that a direction to pay all valid credit obligations
does not grant the authority to determine validity. 79 As to the
necessary action provision, the court found that a direction to
73. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217. The court characterized Hudspeth's argument, that judicial adjudication of claims restrains the FSLIC's receivership powers by delaying distribution of assets, as attempting to derive
substantive powers "by pointing to the time-consuming tasks that FSLIC as a
receiver must undertake." Id. Moreover, the court argued that if judicial review which causes a significant delay does not restrain or affect a receiver,
then initial adjudication by a court creates no such restraint or effect. See
supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. The court noted that the statute
"does not speak in terms of the magnitude of such restraint or effect." Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217. In addition, the court noted that "the Hudspeth
opinion makes no reference to any statutory language or legislative history indicating a congressional intent to confer adjudicatory power upon FSLIC in its
receivership capacity." Id.
74. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. As support for its contention that "[jiudicial adjudication ... does not restrain or affect a receivership; it simply determines the existence and amount of claims that a receiver
is to honor in its eventual distribution of assets," the court cited Morris v.
Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947) ("The establishment of the existence and
amount of a claim against the debtor in no way disturbs the possession of the
liquidation court."). Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1217.
75. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217. The court noted that Hudspeth
"permitted section 1464(d)(6)(C) to expand FSLIC's receivership authority.
We decline to do so." Id.
76. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
78. Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1218-19.
79. Id. at 1218. The court noted that the word valid was required as a
qualifier to prevent the duty to pay from encompassing invalid claims. Id.
The FSLIC's assertion that this provision grants the authority to adjudicate
claims "imposes an unreasonable burden on the plain meaning of simple and
straightforward language." Id.
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do everything necessary in connection with liquidation cannot
alone support a claim to adjudicative authority.8 0 Moreover,
the court reasoned that the necessary action provision's explicit
grant of power to settle, compromise, and release claims is incompatible with an assertion of adjudicative power because a
body authorized to render binding decisions does not need to
settle, compromise, or release claims. 8 ' Consequently, the court
found a congressional grant of adjudicatory power lacking in
the statutes.
Turning to the FHLBB regulations, which provide an administrative procedure for processing creditor claims,8 2 the
court asserted that the ability to disallow claims does not imply
that the FSLIC has the authority to make binding factual and
legal determinations.8 3 Rather, the court characterized the administrative process as merely determining "whether a dispute
exists." 4 The dispute, once identified, is settled by adjudication
in court.15 Consequently, the court concluded that, like the
the FSLIC granted no adstatutes, the regulations relied on by
86
judicatory authority to the FSLIC.
Analyzing the statutory scheme, the court again found no
congressional grant of adjudicatory authority. The court contrasted the FSLIC's statutory role as receiver of failed thrift institutions with its statutory role as insurer of operating
institutions. Various statutes authorize the FSLIC to adjudicate
in its role as insurer and provide guidance as to the procedural
and substantive rights of the parties with review under the
APA.8 7 The court inferred that had Congress intended the
80. Id. at 1219. The court noted that once again the FSLIC "seeks to burden a word... with more weight than it reasonably can carry." Id.
81. Id. The court also commented that the need for "settlement or compromise strongly suggest[s] the presence of the power of the other party to
take the dispute to court," with settling or compromising designed to avoid
such a result. Id.

82. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
83. Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1218. The court noted that the FSLIC
and the FHLBB "must be permitted to exercise some judgment before paying

a claim against a thrift institution." Id. Nevertheless, the court likened the
FSLIC process to that of an insurance company requiring sufficient proof
before paying claims. Id.

84. Id. (emphasis in original). The finality of a FSLIC disallowance to

which a creditor fails to object is not, the court asserted, proof of adjudicative

power but is instead "the ordinary consequence of waiver." Id.
85. Id. The court asserted that "the administrative process ends precisely
where the adjudicative process begins." Id.
86. Id. at 1222.
87. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (1982) (governing hearings provided

for by § 1464); id.§ 1730(j)(2) (governing hearings under § 1730). These stat-
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FSLIC to adjudicate in its role as receiver as well, it would
have provided similar specific authorization of power. 88
In addition, section 1728(c) provides a statute of limitations
for depositor insurance claims brought against the FSLIC in
court.8 9 The court deduced from this statute that Congress
must have similarly intended the FSLIC to litigate rather than
adjudicate creditor claims. 90
Finally, the court noted that section 1730(k)(1), the "jurisdiction provision" which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over all civil actions to which the FSLIC is a party, 91
contains a proviso that certain actions fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of state courts, including actions involving creditor
rights in state-chartered institutions. 92 The court inferred from
utes "provide detailed, exact, and comprehensive measures precisely delineating agency procedure, the remedies available, and judicial review." MorrisonKnudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220.
88. Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1220. The court termed the inference
"irresistible" and commented that Congress would not have "painstakingly circumscribed" the FSLIC's adjudicative authority in its supervisory role as insurer, in which its expertise is greatest, and failed to circumscribe its
adjudicative authority in its role as receiver. Id.
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(c) (1982). The court stated that "[t]he language used
indicates unambiguously that Congress anticipated judicial adjudication in the
event of a disputed [depositor] claim." Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220
(citing Jugum v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (W.D.
Wash. 1986)).
90. The court termed "irrational" an interpretation allowing the FSLIC to
adjudicate creditor claims in which it has little expertise, while requiring it to
litigate depositor claims in which it has significant expertise. MorrisonKnudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220.
91. Id. at 1221. As an additional element in its statutory scheme analysis,
the court noted that unlike the FSLIC, the FDIC has never claimed the right
to adjudicate creditor claims when acting as a receiver. Id. at 1218. During its
discussion of the FSLIC regulations, the court noted that the FDIC has "the
same powers by statute that the [FHLBB] has given FSLIC by regulation: to
receive 'legal' proof of creditors' claims and to pay only on 'such claims as may
have been proved to its satisfaction.'" Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 193, 194, 1821(d)
(1982)). According to the court, the legislative history of the DIA, Pub. L. No.
97-320, § 122, 96 Stat. 1469, 1480-83 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1729), indicates congressional intent to give the two agencies "parallel authority over
their respective institutions." Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221 (citing S.
REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3054). Congress easily could have distinguished the FSLIC's receivership functions from the FDIC's but did not do so, leading the court to
conclude that the FDIC's receivership practice provides a persuasive model for
the FSLIC's receivership powers. Id. at 1221. In addition, the court noted that
the FDIC's "longstanding interpretation of the receiver's role, acquiesced in by
Congress, [is] very persuasive authority" because it had been defending disputed creditor claims in its capacity as receiver for longer than the FSLIC. Id.
92. Id. at 1220. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1)(B) (1982) provides:
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the proviso that Congress intended the FSLIC to defend creditor suits in court.9 3 The court thus rejected the argument that
Congress intended the FSLIC as receiver to adjudicate creditor
claims, holding instead that Congress intended the FSLIC to
pay all undisputed claims, without court supervision, settling or
releasing such claims as it sees fit, but not to adjudicate disputed claims.9 4 Consequently, the court concluded that the
statutory scheme, like the statutes and regulations, does not indicate any congressional grant to the FSLIC of the authority to
adjudicate claims.
To prevent claimants from inappropriately bypassing the
FSLIC's claim procedure, however, the court held that district
courts should consider requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies when creditor claimants file suit. As a result, the
court remanded the cases for the district courts to determine
[A]ny civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the [FSLIC] shall be a
party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States,
and the United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction
thereof, without regard to the amount in controversy; ... [p]rovided,
[t]hat any action... to which the [FSLIC] is a party in its capacity as
..

receiver... of an insured State-chartered institution and which

involves only the rights or obligations of... creditors... and such
institution under State law shall not be deemed to arise under the
laws of the United States."
Id. (emphasis in original). The court noted that the proviso clause "is designed
to keep certain actions in state courts." Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1220.
93. Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1221. The court noted that the purpose
of § 1730(k)(1) is to distribute jurisdiction between federal and state courts and
that jurisdictional limitations still apply. Id. at 1220. The plaintiffs apparently
urged a reading of the statute that would grant federal courts jurisdiction
whenever the proviso clause did not apply. The court pointed out that carrying this theory to its logical conclusion would grant federal courts jurisdiction
even if a case raised only a moot or political question, a result beyond congressional authority. The court commented, however, that the statute fails to "address how the initial distribution of jurisdiction between administrative and
judicial tribunals, be the latter state or federal, is to be accomplished." Id.
Nevertheless, § 1730(k)(1) indicates that Congress intended state courts to adjudicate state law creditor claims. The court finished this line of reasoning by
stating that Congress intended the FSLIC's powers to be identical with respect
to state- and federally-chartered institutions, thus concluding "that Congress
clearly expected creditors' suits against FSLIC as receiver to be . . . adjudicated in court." Id. at 1221. The court cited 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c) (1982), which
"grant[s] FSLIC the 'same powers' as receiver for state associations as it has
for federal ones," as an indication of congressional intent that FSLIC powers
as receiver over state and federal institutions be identical. Id.
94. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222. The court stated that the
"FSLIC stands in the shoes of the insured institution" when acting as receiver,
and thus is required to adjudicate disputed claims in court "just as the institutions it represents would have had to do." Id.
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the appropriateness of requiring such exhaustion. 95 The exhaustion requirement, according to the court, will allow courts
to balance the FSLIC's interest in applying its expertise and
the interests of claimants in remaintaining efficiency against
96
ceiving appropriate relief.
III.

THE SCOPE OF THE FSLIC's
RECEIVERSHIP POWERS

The Ninth Circuit in Morrison-Knudsen relied primarily
on the statutes and regulations in denying FSLIC adjudicatory
authority. Further support for the court's result may be found
in the legislative history of the statutes and regulations as well
as in an examination of the article III constitutional violation
and policy problems inherent in the FSLIC's current assumption of adjudicative power. This section presents those arguments and proposes a legislative solution that goes beyond the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement to balance
the rights of both creditor claimants and the FSLIC.
95. Id. at 1223. The court listed factors for the district courts to consider
when ruling on the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. These
factors included
whether resort to the administrative process would be futile, whether
the administrative process is well understood and well developed,
whether a prompt decision as to all of the contested issues in the case
is likely, whether an exhaustion [of remedies] requirement would be
fair to the parties in light of their resources, whether it would be fair
to other parties in the case whose interests might be affected, whether
the interests of judicial economy would be served by requiring exhaustion, and whether the agency demonstrates that not requiring exhaustion would unduly interfere with its functioning.
Id. at 1223-24.
96. Id. at 1223. The court stated that the exhaustion requirement, in the
absence of a statutory directive, is a judicially created doctrine which does not
limit jurisdiction and is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Id. (citing Wong v. Department of State, 789 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1986); Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court commented
that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is a means for the court "to exercise
comity toward administrative agencies and to promote efficient use of judicial
resources while protecting the rights of parties who have come before the
court seeking relief." Id. In addition, the court noted that the district court
has three options: it can allow the case to proceed, it can dismiss the case, or it
can stay the proceedings pending exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
last option, the court observed, is preferable because it prevents a statute of
limitations problem from developing. Id.
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A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Restrain or Affect Provision

The pivotal provision in the FSLIC's statutory interpretation of its adjudicatory authority is section 1464(d)(6)(C), which
prohibits courts from restraining or affecting the FSLIC's receivership functions.97 A careful reading of the restrain or affect provision reveals that the prohibition against court
interference applies to the exercise of receivership powers or
functions. already possessed by the FSLIC.9s In upholding the
FSLIC's adjudicatory power, the Fifth Circuit in North Mississippi Savings & Loan v. Hudspeth held that delay in the distribution of assets caused by adjudication of creditor claims was a
restraint within the meaning of the restrain or affect provision.9 9 As the Morrison-Knudsen court commented, however,
judicial review under the APA would delay distribution of assets in the same manner as initial adjudication. 0 0 Consequently, unless Congress intended no judicial consideration of
creditor claims, an unlikely result in light of congressional concern for the rights of individuals expressed in the legislative
history,' 0 ' the restrain or affect provision does not prohibit
court interference because of concerns with delays in asset
distribution. 02
The key question is thus whether the FSLIC is authorized
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982); see supa notes 32-33, 72 and accompanying text. This section is pivotal because it outlines the situations in which
courts lack jurisdiction over the FSLIC as a receiver. Section 1730(k)(1)
grants courts jurisdiction over suits against the FSLIC, including, at least in
the case of state courts, jurisdiction over creditor claims. See supra notes 92-93
and accompanying text. Without the specific prohibition against court interference, the FSLIC could not prevent courts from adjudicating creditor claims
even if the statutes also supported administrative adjudication of such claims.
Consequently, establishing that Congress intended § 1464(d)(6)(C) to apply to
adjudication of creditor claims is critical to the FSLIC's interpretation.
98. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statute. When interpreting statutes, courts prefer the plain meaning of the language to any hidden or obscure meanings. See, e.g., Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d
1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 1931). The restrain or affect provision does not outline the
FSLIC's receivership powers but rather applies to the powers specified by
either common law or other statutes.
99. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); see
supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
100. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987); see
supra note 73 and accompanying text. The court pointed out that the statute
does not specify the magnitude of an impermissible restraint. Id. at 1217.
101. See infra note 112.
102. The Morrison-Knudsen court reached the same conclusion. See supra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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to adjudicate either implicitly through its receivership role or
explicitly by the statutes or regulations. Traditionally, receivers are responsible for only an initial determination of creditor
claims which claimants can appeal to the supervising court for
a de novo trial on the merits.10 3 Accordingly, authority to adjudicate with limited, deferential review is not implicit in the receivership role, which means that the restrain or affect
provision does not apply to such adjudication unless other statutes, regulations, or the restrain or affect provision itself grant
10 4
the FSLIC the authority to adjudicate.
The legislative history, however, illustrates that Congress
did not intend the restrain or affect provision to expand the
FSLIC's receivership powers.' 0 5 Congress passed the restrain
or affect provision as part of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA).10 The FISA's purpose was to give the
FSLIC more regulatory options to prevent defaults in its role as
insurer of thrift institutions. 107 The receivership provisions, in103. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
104. The Morrison-Knudsen court reached a similar conclusion. See supra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
105. At least one court has claimed that language in the legislative history
discussing administrative review supports the FSLIC's position. Lyons Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorp., 636 F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. IlM.1986) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 2077, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966)), alff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1987). The history cited falls under the broad heading "Hearings and Review"
and is a complement to a paragraph beginning "[h]earings provided for in the
bill." H.R. REP. No. 2077, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966). The provision covering
judical review under the APA, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7) (1982), by its
own terms applies to "[a]ny hearing provided for in this subsection (d)." Id.
§ 1464(d)(7)(A). Section 1464(d)(6), the section covering receiverships, does
not provide for any administrative hearings. Therefore the provision for review under the APA does not apply to the FSLIC's receivership functions.
106. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
The FISA allows the FSLIC to intervene in thrift management problems at an
early stage, authorizing the FHLBB to issue cease-and-desist orders to and remove officers of dangerously mismanaged thrift institutions. Prior to the
FISA, in confronting a mismanaged institution the FHLBB was faced with the
"choice between letting the matter ride, commencing a slow determination of
whether the association is in violation, or moving to take complete control of
the institution [through receivership]." FinancialInstitutionsSupervisory Act
of 1966: Hearingson S. 3158 Before a Subcommr of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966) (statement of John E. Horne,
Chairman, FHLBB). The FISA provided "new and effective intermediate
remedies, more limited in impact and more readily employable." Id. at 13.
107. The purpose of the FISA was to "arm regulatory agencies with a
wider range of effective enforcement remedies" in order "to assure the continued good health of [thrift] institutions." H.R. REP. No. 2077, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1966). "The thrust of this bill.., is merely to provide sorely needed
flexibility to protect the public's money." Id. at 5.
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cluding the restrain or affect provision, are the ultimate tool in
the FSLIC's regulation of mismanaged thrifts.108 The legislative history contains no discussion of the FSLIC's functions as a
receiver, and both Congress and witnesses at the hearing on the
FISA virtually ignored the receivership provisions. 0 9 The only
legislative history relevant to the restrain or affect provision in
the Senate Report merely restates the terms of the provision. 110
It seems likely that had Congress intended the restrain or affect provision's prohibition on judicial interference to include
the creation of an important judicial function such as adjudicating creditor claims, the provision would have incited significant
debate."
108. The legislative history indicates that Congress designed the receivership provisions as part of the regulatory scheme:
In the light of the new enforcement powers provided by the bill,
the committee would expect the [FHLBB] to appoint a .. . receiver

only in cases where it judged that the exercise of the lesser intermediate remedies would not adequately protect the interests of the public
or of the savings account holders of the association or of the [FSLIC].
S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADumN. NEWS 3532, 3545.

109. Various thrift industry associations proposed the removal of
§ 1464(d)(6)(C) from the FISA along with all other provisions denying access
to courts to preserve judicial recourse granted under other laws. FinancialInstitutions Supervisory Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 593 (1966)
(explanation of changes in markup of S. 3158 suggested by the National
League of Insured Savings Associations). The associations might have feared
that courts would lose jurisdiction over FSLIC receiverships. Because the associations' specific protest was in regard to the FHLBB rather than a judge appointing the receiver, the inference can be drawn that the thrift industry was
concerned about the grant of appointment power to the FHLBB in its supervisory capacity rather than the grant of greater receivership powers to the
FSLIC.
110. S.REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3532. "The provisions of this subparagraph would, in
effect, limit the jurisdiction of a court to order the removal of a ...receiver,
...or, except at the instance of the [FHLBB], to restrain the exercise of the
powers or functions of a ...receiver." Id., reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 3545. This history contributes nothing to the question of
whether adjudication of creditor claims is a receivership function because it
fails to define receivership functions or explain what constitutes a restraint or
effect within the scope of the statute.
111. In contrast to the lack of testimony on the receivership provisions,
many witnesses testified on the perceived usurpation of state regulatory authority by the expanded federal powers. See, e.g., FinancialInstitutionsSupervisory Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1966) (statement
of Allan Housely, First Vice President, National Association of State Savings
& Loan Supervisors) (FHLBB "should not be permitted to take any action involving insured, State-chartered associations without consultation with the
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Moreover, the legislative history reveals significant congressional concern with protecting the rights of individuals who
might be affected by the FSLIC's proposed new regulatory
powers in its role as insurer, but no discussion of how the FISA
11
might affect the rights of creditors in FSLIC receiverships. 2
The lack of controversy over the receivership section thus buttresses the Morrison-Knudsen court's conclusion that Congress
did not intend the prohibition on judicial interference to
broaden the FSLIC's receivership functions.11 3 Consequently,
State Supervisor"); id. at 247 (statement of Milton Stewart, Special Counsel,
Savings Association League of New York State) (Congress should exempt
state associations from federal regulation if state regulatory authorities regulate such associations to FHLBB's satisfaction). This concern with the apportionment of regulatory authority between federal and state agencies illustrates
that a perceived federal agency usurpation of adjudicatory authority in FSLIC
receiverships would have sparked significant controversy.
112. The Committee heard a substantial amount of testimony from members of the savings and loan association community on the issue of procedural
safeguards to protect the rights of individual thrift association officers affected
by the regulatory powers established in the FISA. One member testified that
"[t]he practical effect of the review procedures recommended by [the FHLBB]
...are not due process de facto even if they could ultimately succeed in being
classified as due process de jure." FinancialInstitutions Supervisory Act of
1966: Hearings on S. 3158 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1966) (statement of Arthur H.
Courshon, National League of Insured Savings Associations). The Committee
concluded, however, that the insurers' concerns were unfounded.
The enactment of this legislation will result in substantial improvement in the supervision and regulation of... savings and loan
associations. The provisions in the bill for administrative hearings
and judicial review of final orders will adequately protect the rights of
any insured institution and its officers, directors, or other persons
against whom action proves necessary.
Id. at 319A.
The legislative history demonstrates that congressional concern with
FSLIC protection mentioned in many decisions must be balanced against the
congressional interest in protecting individuals from peremptory agency action. Consequently, evidence of congressional intent to shield the FSLIC is insufficient to support a significant grant of adjudicatory power based on meager
statutory authority despite the FSLIC's current financial difficulties. The
Morrison-Knudsencourt reached the same conclusion. Morrison-Knudsen,811
F.2d at 1216; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
113. The legislative history contains the following statement: "These new
tools do not expand Federal control over insured institutions, because.., the
[FSLIC] already possess[es] the ultimate authority over an insured institution,
that of terminating its insured status." H.R. REP. No. 2077, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-5 (1966). Although it may be debatable that the new supervisory powers authorized by the FISA do not expand federal powers, it is clear that Congress intended the FISA to refine the FSLIC's supervisory powers in
regulating thrift institutions, not to expand the FSLIC's powers over individual creditors in its receivership capacity.
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the FSLIC's asserted authority to adjudicate creditor claims
must be found elsewhere in the statutes or regulations.
2. Payment and Necessary Action Provisions
Apart from the restrain or affect provision, courts have relied on the payment and the necessary action provisions of section 1729, both established by the National Housing Act of 1934
(NHA)," 4 as authority for the FSLIC to adjudicate claims.'1 5
In contrast to ordinary receivers who must apply to the supervisory court for authorization to pay claims," 6 the FSLIC has
the power, granted by the payment provision, to pay all valid
claims. 117 The payment provision, however, does not specify
who is authorized to determine which claims are valid." 8
The legislative history of the NHA, moreover, contains no
discussion of the payment provision." 9 This lack of controversy indicates that neither Congress nor hearing witnesses
viewed the payment provision as granting an unprecedented adjudicatory function to the FSLIC in its role as receiver. 120 Consequently, although the section does grant the FSLIC authority
to pay all valid claims, it does not support the FSLIC's assertion
of the right to adjudicate what constitutes a valid creditor claim
in case of a dispute.
The necessary action provision, which grants the FSLIC
the power to do all things necessary in liquidating institutions,
114. Ch. 395, § 406(b), (d), 48 Stat. 1246, 1260 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729) (1982).
115. See, e.g., North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096,
1102 (5th Cir. 1985) (section 1729 authorizes FSLIC to liquidate and distribute
receivership assets), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Sunrise Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. LIR Dev. Co., 641 F. Supp. 744, 746 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (section 1729 authorizes FSLIC to liquidate institutions subject only to FHLBB regulation);
Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorp., 636 F. Supp. 576, 581 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (section 1729(d) "reiterates in its language the FHLBB's exclusive regulatory authority over the FSLIC's actions"), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987).
116. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
117. See supra text accompanying note 35.
118. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
119. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
120. In contrast to the lack of controversy over the receivership provisions,
the provisions establishing the price of FSLIC insurance and the FSLIC's governance attracted significant debate. See, e.g., National Housing Act of 1934:
Hearings on S. 3603 Before the Senate Comn. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1934) (statement of I. Friedlander, President, Gibraltar
Savings & Building Association) (cost of proposed insurance "unnecessarily
igh"); id. at 261 (statement of Morton Bodfish, Executive Vice President,
United States Building & Loan League) (rather than FHLBB, board of trustees should govern FSLIC).
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including the right to settle, compromise, or release claims, also
12 1
fails to provide support for FSLIC adjudication of claims.
Although the Morrison-Knudsencourt reasoned that the power
to settle, compromise, or release claims is inconsistent with authority to adjudicate,12 2 the court failed to recognize that Congress may have granted these powers to give the FSLIC the
flexibility to effect a compromise rather than rule on a disputed
claim which could entangle the receivership in a lengthy judicial review process. Nevertheless, the necessary action provision places the word necessary in the context of receivership
functions in liquidating institutions, indicating that Congress intended the necessary actions to be defined with reference to ac123
cepted receivership powers.
Moreover, the only legislative history relevant to the necessary action provision likens the liquidation functions granted
the FSLIC to those granted the FDIC,1 2 4 which has never asserted the right to adjudicate creditor claims.' 25 In addition,
the lack of controversy over the necessary action provision, as
with the payment provision, demonstrates that Congress did
not intend the word necessary to include adjudication of creditor claims. 12 6 Thus, like the payment provision, the necessary
action provision provides no support for the FSLIC's assertion
that Congress intended the FSLIC to adjudicate creditor
27
claims.1
121.

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.

122. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
123. The statute begins with the phrase, "[i]n connection with the liquidation of insured institutions.... ." 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
124. H.R. REP. No. 1922, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1934) ("Adequate
provision is made for the liquidation of insured institutions somewhat similar
to the plan for the liquidation of banks which are under Federal deposit
insurance.").
125. See supra note 91.
126. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
127. Northern Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.
1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986), bolstered its holding with the principle
of deference to agency interpretation. Id. at 1103; see supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551
(1979), the Supreme Court implied that such deference is not determinative:
It is a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative
agency's consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under
which it operates is entitled to considerable weight. This deference is
a product both of an awareness of the practical expertise which an
agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new and unforeseen problems over time. But this deference is constrained by our
obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its
language, purpose, and history.
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3. FHLBB Regulations
The FSLIC also contends that FHLBB regulations governing the processing of creditor claims in receiverships support its assertion of authority to adjudicate creditor claims.12 8
The regulations, however, establish a procedure for handling
creditor claims similar to the one used in traditional receiverships.12 9 Nothing in the language of the regulations indicates
that the FHLBB intended the FSLIC to adjudicate creditor
claims.' 3 0 In fact, the absence of controversy regarding the regulations when the FHLBB proposed them actually supports the
assertion that the FHLBB did not intend them to encompass
adjudication of creditor claims.' 3 ' If the interested members of

the business community had viewed the proposed regulations as
encompassing binding adjudication of creditor claims rather
Id. at 566 n.20 (citations omitted). Consequently, the FSLIC's interpretation,
which is unsupported by § 1729(d)'s language, purpose, or history, is not entitled to deference. Moreover, the FSLIC's interpretation is neither consistent
nor longstanding because it did not assert the right to adjudicate creditor
claims until the 1980s. See Morrison-Knudsen,811 F.2d at 1216.
128. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. The well-established
procedure for review of creditor claims by receivers does not imply that binding adjudication of creditor claims is a receivership function. Although courts
may require processing of claims through the receivership procedure, it is an
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement rather than a denial of
subject matter jurisdiction for courts to adjudicate such claims. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947), found that "[t]he
establishment of the existence and amount of a claim against the debtor in no
way disturbs the possession of the liquidation court ... and does not necessarily involve a determination of what priority the claim should have." Moreover,
the supervisory court retains complete control over the receiver who is an instrument of the court, not a separate body making independent judgments.
Furthermore, a disputed claim results in a trial on the merits, not a review
giving deference to the receiver's factual findings.
130. The differences between the regulations governing federal associations
and those governing state associations actually indicate that the FHLBB did
not intend the FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims. The regulations governing
state associations omit both the provision that denials not protested within
thirty days will be final and the provision that the FSLIC shall pay all allowed
claims as directed by the FHLBB. See 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8 (1987). The lack of
these provisions demonstrates that the FHLBB expected the FSLIC to be governed by state court receivership procedures when it was appointed receiver
by such courts.
131. The FHLBB first proposed the regulations in 21 Fed. Reg. 813, 820
(1956) with invitation for comments from interested parties. The regulations
were made effective in 21 Fed. Reg. 4546, 4553 (1956) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 541-56) with the following comment: "no persons have filed any written
data or made oral arguments with respect [to the published regulations], either
within the time alloted or at any later date." Id. at 4554.
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than the usual processing of such claims by receivers, they
would have protested the denial of their right to court
adjudication. 132
Moreover, the lack of procedures for a hearing, production
of documents, or the like sharply contrasts with other FHLBB
regulations which provide detailed procedures for investigative
proceedings against savings and loan associations by the FSLIC
in its regulatory capacity. 133 The lack of procedures further indicates that the FHLBB did not intend the FSLIC to adjudicate
creditor claims when it promulgated the regulations. 13 As the
132. It is possible to argue that the regulations substitute the FHLBB for a
court in the traditional receivership model because the regulations specify that
the FSLIC file approved claims with the FHLBB and allow the FHLBB to approve claims disallowed by the FSLIC. See 12 C.F.R. § 549.4 (1987). The lack
of controversy over the regulations, however, argues strongly against such a
construction. The FHLBB's role as supervisor of FSLIC receiverships, moreover, is based on the fact that the FSLIC is only a division of the FHLBB, not
an independent agency. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The regulations allow the FHLBB to have final control over the FSLIC's receivership determinations in accordance with its statutory governance of the FSLIC, not as
a substitute for a court.
Furthermore, the regulations governing state associations contain the
same provisions regarding FSLIC filing of claims with the FHLBB and
FHLBB approval of denied claims. See 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8 (1987). In 1956,
when the FHLBB promulgated the regulations, the only way the FSLIC could
be appointed receiver for a state association was by a state court, which required governance by the state court, not the FHLBB. See infra notes 137-38
and accompanying text. Consequently, allowing the FHLBB to supervise the
FSLIC's processing of creditor claims does not indicate that the FHLBB intended to substitute itself for a court in the traditional model.
133. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 512 (1987). This provision contains elaborate procedures covering the transcripts, the rights of witnesses, and subpoenas in
FSLIC investigations under 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(h)(2) (1982), which concerns
compliance with the FSLIC's regulations in regard to holding companies.
134. The FHLBB itself apparently does not consider that the current regulations provide sufficiently strong support for adjudication of creditor claims
because it has recently proposed new regulations explicitly authorizing the
FSLIC to adjudicate such claims. The FHLBB offered the new regulations in
50 Fed. Reg. 48,970 (1985) (proposed Nov. 8, 1985), containing the statement
that the "[FHLBB] may ... establish additional procedures . .. in much the
same manner as a court supervising a court-appointed equity receivership." Id.
at 48,971. As adopted in the new regulations, "all claims against a receiver, including those that arise during the pendency of the receivership, must be
presented to the receiver for administrative determination." Id. at 48,978. The
proposed regulations still require submission of creditor claims on brief forms
but allow the FSLIC to request further written documentation at the FSLIC's
discretion. The regulations contain no provision for hearings on creditor
claims. Id. The proposed regulations provide appeal to courts but restrict judicial review to the written record established in the claims process subject to
the APA. Id. at 48,979-80.
The FHLBB apparently does not view the statutes as clearly supporting
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Morrison-Knudsen court determined, the current regulations
provide only an efficient procedure to separate out disputed
claims for court adjudication while shielding undisputed claims
from the expensive adjudicatory process, but they do not encompass adjudication of creditor claims. 135 Consequently, like
the statutes, the regulations do not support the FSLIC's alleged
authority to adjudicate creditor claims.
4.

Statutory Scheme

The Morrison-Knudsen court found that the statutory
scheme provided further evidence that Congress intended
courts, and not the FSLIC, to adjudicate creditor claims against
FSLIC receiverships. 136 An examination of the legislative history, moreover, sheds additional light on congressional intent in
the statutory scheme. The legislative history of the Bank Protection Act of 1968, which granted the FHLBB the power to appoint the FSLIC as receiver of state thrift institutions, offers
some support for the FHLBB's interpretation. 3 7 The history
indicates Congress intended to give the FSLIC control over the
its claim to adjudicatory power because the proposal quotes a significant por-

tion of the Hudspeth opinion, see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text, as
authority for its assertion of adjudicatory power. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970, 48,977

(1985).
135. Review by the FHLBB may also be considered, as phrased by the Morrison-Knudsen court, to be merely a determination that a dispute exists. See
supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. Several courts have asserted that
congressional acquiescence in the regulations, promulgated in 1956, is evidence
that Congress intended the FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims. See, e.g., First
Am. Sav. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan, 639 F. Supp. 93, 98 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (Congress intended FSLIC adjudication by acquiescing in FHLBB regulations); Baer v. Abel, 637 F. Supp. 347, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (Congress acquiesced in FHLBB regulations allowing adjudication of claims). Because the
regulations do not provide for adjudication of creditor claims, congressional acquiescence to them is actually evidence that Congress did not intend the
FSLIC to adjudicate such claims.
136. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text. The Morrison-Knudsen
court used the FDIC interpretation as another consideration arguing against
FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims. See supra note 91. The FDIC has the
same powers regarding processing of creditor claims that the FSLIC has by
regulation accorded to it by statute. The FDIC, however, has never asserted
the right to adjudicate creditor claims. See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG
Int'l, 811 F.2d 1209, 1218 (9th Cir. 1987). The FDIC statutes, however, lack the
"restrain or affect" language found in § 1464(d)(6)(C), the pivotal statutory
provision used by courts to assert their lack of jurisdiction over creditor claims
in FSLIC receiversbips. See Colony First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 643 F. Supp. 410, 416 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
137. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1729(c)(2), (3) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)); see supra note 31.
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disposition of failed institutions' assets to recoup its insurance
payments quickly.138 The Senate Report comments that the
FSLIC's financial viability is necessary to maintain public confidence in the thrift industry,13 9 the precise congressional concern on which the FSLIC bases its current assertion of the
1 40
right to adjudicate creditor claims.
Much of the legislative history, however, does not support
the FSLIC's position. The legislative history uses the terms disposition and liquidation of assets, but it never mentions adjudication of the validity or priority of claims to the assets.1 41 The
situation cited in the Senate Report as the reason for extending
the FHLBB's authority over state institutions was one in which
a protracted state-appointed receivership had apparently mismanaged the receivership assets and had failed to liquidate
138.

S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6-11, reprinted in 1968 U.S.

CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2531, 2535-40.
The legislation also authorizes the [FHLBB]

to appoint the

[FSLIC] as a receiver in the case of State-chartered savings and loan
associations placed in receivership ... by State authorities. The aim
of the legislation is to enable the FSLIC to effect an orderly disposition of the assets of insured associations whose depositors have been
reimbursed by FSLIC insurance payments. Since the FSLIC would
normally have a claim to at least 95 percent of the assets of a Stateinsured association undergoing liquidation, the FSLIC has a vital interest in seeing that the liquidation of the association proceeds in an
orderly manner.
Id. at 1-2, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2530-31.
The Senate Report further states that "[tihe basic objective of the legislation is to safeguard the financial integrity of [FSLIC]." Id. at 6, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2535. Additionally, "[t]he reserves of
the FSLIC are not unlimited and cannot stand an indefinite repetition of unrecovered receiverships." Id. at 8, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2537.
139. The Senate Report states:
Much of the credit for maintaining this public confidence [in the savings and loan industry] must be attributed to the savings account insurance provided by [FSLIC]. Therefore, if the ability of the FSLIC
to meet its insurance commitments is ever called into question, there
would be grounds for serious public concern.
Id. at 6, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2536. The Report uses the need to maintain FSLIC reserves as justification for extending
the FHLBB's power to appoint the FSLIC as receiver over state institutions.
Id. at 8, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2537.
140. The FSLIC places great emphasis on congressional intent to protect
its reserves in claiming the authority to adjudicate creditor claims. See supra
notes 17-21 and accompanying text. The FSLIC's precarious financial situation
prompted many courts to agree with the FSLIC's interpretation. See supra
notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
141. S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2530-31.
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them properly.142 The state-appointed receiver also had refused to give the FSLIC information as to the conduct or status
of the receivership. 143 The legislative history does not mention
any concern with adjudication of creditor claims delaying the
receivership. 1 4 In fact, the main policy concern expressed in
the legislative history is the apportionment of control between
the FSLIC and state regulatory agencies, not the extension of
the FSLIC's power over the rights of individual creditors. 145
Congressional concern for the FSLIC's financial situation thus
only applied to extending federal regulatory control over traditional receivership functions, not to extending the FSLIC's re142. Congress passed the Bank Protection Act in response to several simultaneous state-appointed receiverships which tied up receivership assets for
years. The Senate report cited as an example the receivership of Marshall
Savings and Loan Association of Illinois which had "free use of the FSLIC's
$83 million paid to the association's insured savers." Id. at 7, reprintedin 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2537. In the report's calculation,
[t]he unpaid interest on $83 million at 4.5 percent for 3 years amounts
to nearly $12 million. When the financial condition of the association
is adjusted to reflect this unpaid interest, the association was insolvent on March 31, 1968, by almost $11 million, compared to the admitted insolvency of $6.7 million when the association first went into
receivership.
Id. at 8, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2537.
143. In regard to the Marshall receivership, the report commented that
"[it was not until the Senate Banking and Currency Committee held hearings
on this measure that the Illinois savings and loan commissioner agreed to
make some financial records on Marshall available to the FSLIC and the committee." Id. at 8, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2537.
It was the fear of mismanaged assets and lack of control over the traditional
receivership functions of conserving and liquidating receivership assets, as reflected in the Marshall situation, that prompted the Bank Protection Act, not
any perceived delays caused by judicial adjudication of creditor claims.
144. In the explanation of § 406(c)(3)(B), codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(c)(3)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), the report comments that "[i]n carrying
out its receivership responsibilities, the committee expects the FSLIC to give
due consideration to the interest of all of the claimants upon the assets of the
association, including general creditors, uninsured depositors, and association
stockholders." S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2539. The comment illustrates congressional concern with preserving the assets of the institution during liquidation
in preparation for the final distribution, but it gives no indication that the
FSLIC is authorized to determine the validity and priority of claims for such
distribution.
145. " o permit the [FHLBB] to appoint the FSLIC as a receiver for State
associations does, of course, have implications for the division of responsibility
between the States and Federal Government." S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2538. The
committee went on to state, however, that "[FHLBB's] authority to appoint
the FSLIC as receiver would not be exercised if the state authorities were able
to handle the problem." Id.
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ceivership powers to adjudication of creditor claims. 146
The Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (DIA), which extended the restrain or affect provision's prohibition on court interference with FSLIC receiverships to such receiverships even
when a state court, rather than the FHLBB, appoints the
FSLIC as receiver, provides additional support for the Morrison-Knudsen court's holding.147 The FSLIC interprets the relevant statutes, through the operation of the restrain or affect
provision, as granting it exclusive jurisdiction over anything it
deems necessary to the receivership, including creditor
claims. 148 The result of the FSLIC's interpretation is to strip
state courts of any jurisdiction over such claims, even though
state receivership statutes grant state courts such jurisdiction.149 Such a result is contrary to the legislative history of the
DIA, which observes that state authorities may still appoint the
FSLIC as receiver and require the FSLIC to act according to
state regulation.150 Furthermore, the FSLIC's interpretation
conflicts with the necessary action provision's specific grant of
jurisdiction to state courts over state-appointed FSLIC receiverships,' 5 ' and the jurisdiction provision's specific denial of juris146. In addition, Congress has also expressed concern for the rights of private parties when extending the FSLIC's regulatory powers. See supra note
112.
147. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
149. In traditional receiverships courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed creditor claims de novo. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
The FSLIC cannot claim that § 1464(d)(6)(C) means one thing in respect to
FHLBB-appointed receiverships and another thing with respect to state-appointed receiverships because § 1729(c)(3)(A) clearly states that when the
FSLIC is appointed receiver by a state authority "the provisions of section
1464(d) of this title shall be applicable in the same manner and to the same
extent as if such institution were a Federal savings and loan association with
respect to which [FSLIC] had been appointed receiver." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(c)(3)(A) (1982 & Supp. I 1983). Congress thus intended that the restrain or affect language apply in the same manner to all FSLIC receiverships.
150. The Senate Report notes that "the FSLIC still could accept an appointment as receiver ... from a State authority, and operate according to its
regulation." S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADM1N. NEWS 3054, 3102. Congress intended to provide the
"FSLIC with.., receivership powers over State-Chartered insured institutions
approximately equal to those which it now has with respect to Federal Associations." Id. Nevertheless, Congress explicitly preserved the right of state
regulatory authorities to appoint the FSLIC as receiver and require the FSLIC
to operate under state regulation, illustrating congressional intent that courts
still have jurisdiction at least when a state authority appoints the FSLIC as
receiver.
151. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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diction to federal courts in state receiverships concerning
questions of state law.152 The conflict indicates that Congress
did not view the liquidation and disposition of assets as encompassing adjudication of creditor claims. Thus, consideration of
the statutory scheme, especially in light of the legislative history, buttresses the conclusion that Congress did not intend the
FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims.

B. ARTICLE III VIOLATION
Not only is FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims unsupported by statutory authority, 153 it also violates article III of the
Constitution, which limits congressional grants of adjudicatory
power to administrative agencies and nonarticle III courts.' T
The Morrison-Knudsen court noted the possibility of an article
III violation but declined to reach a decision as to the alleged
55
constitutional defect.
The Supreme Court examines several factors in determining whether administrative agency adjudication is constitutionally permissible. 156 Considering the factor of the origin of the
adjudicated rights, the mere fact that the FSLIC, a federal
agency, is a party does not require characterization of the creditor rights as public. 157 In defending creditor claims the FSLIC
is acting as a substitute for the failed institution, not as a federal agent. 158 Moreover, the FSLIC did not create the rights;
the claims of Gibralter against Westside in Morrison-Knudsen,
152. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
153. At least one court has admitted that the statutory authority for FSLIC
adjudication of claims is meager. That court, however, followed Hudspeth,
holding that the statutory scheme, bolstered by deference to the FHLBB's

opinion, is persuasive. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Oldenburg, 658 F.
Supp. 609, 611 (D. Utah 1987).

154. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
155. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221-22. The court noted that Congress could construct adjudicatory jurisdiction for the FSLIC with carefully
crafted limitations similar to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 1730 (1982), the statutes governing the FSLIC's adjudication of regulatory violations. In the opinion of the
court, however, Congress has not chosen to grant such adjudicatory power.

Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1219-20. The court "reject[ed] FSLIC's interpretation because it raises these 'serious' constitutional difficulties which the
statutes can quite 'fairly be read' to avoid." Id. at 1222 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3252 (1986)).
156. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 587 (1985) (identity of parties not determinative in article III violation).

158. The FSLIC, in its receivership capacity, steps into the shoes of the
failed institution. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222.
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for example, were based on state contract law.1 5 9 The majority

of creditor claims against failed thrifts are likewise based on
state law.160 Consequently, the private rights the FSLIC seeks
to adjudicate are those not created by the federal government,
the precise rights that "lie at the core of the historically recog1
nized judicial power.'

61

Another factor the Supreme Court examines in article III
analysis is the amount of judicial power usurped by the administrative agency.1 62 In adjudicating creditor claims the FSLIC
usurps a wide range of judicial powers by denying federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims and
reach a judgment based on the evidence presented. 163 Some
courts have found no article III violation in FSLIC adjudication
because the FSLIC's decisions are not enforceable as binding final judgments. 16 Nevertheless, the FSLIC does not require judicial recognition of its judgments to enforce them.165 The
FSLIC is authorized to pay all valid claims under the direction
of the FHLBB. 166 If the FSLIC has the power to determine validity, it can pay the claims it finds valid and force claimants
whose claims it disallows to pursue judicial review, just as they
would if a district court had denied their claims. 167 The
159. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Chupik Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 790 F.2d
1269, 1269-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving a materialman's lien perfected under
state law); North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1099
(5th Cir. 1985) (involving an employment contract under state law), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
161. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
70 (1982). The Morrison-Knudsen court noted that the creditor rights at issue
arguably constituted private rather than public rights. Morrison-Knudsen, 811
F.2d at 1221. The court commented "that FSLIC may well be seeking to adjudicate matters of state contract law reserved to Article III courts." Id. at 122122 n.4.
162. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639
F. Supp. 93, 99 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (no article III violation because FSLIC's actions are not binding and review is available under APA); Lyons Say. & Loan
1986) (no article III
Ass'n v. Westside Bancorp., 636 F. Supp. 576, 582 (N.D. Ill.
violation because FSLIC cannot "render 'final judgement' or issue 'binding orders' "), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987).
165. The Thomas Court cited the adjudicatory scheme's system of internal
sanctions as evidence that the intrusion on the judiciary was minimal. 473 U.S.
at 591. Thomas, however, involved a question of public, not private, rights created by the executive branch. The FSLIC's adjudication, in contrast, involves
private rights traditionally adjudicated by the judiciary.
166. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
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FSLIC's determinations thus have the impact, if not the technical effect, of binding final judgments. Moreover, judicial review
subject to the deferential standards of the APA, 168 the only review available according to the FSLIC, does not preserve constitutionality when private rights are at issue. 169 Consequently,
the current FSLIC adjudication scheme intrudes impermissibly
on the powers of the judiciary. 170
Another factor the Supreme Court uses in determining if
an adjudicatory grant of power to an administrative agency is
constitutional is the congressional reason for the grant.171 The
FSLIC cites congressional concern with promoting efficiency 172
in
its receiverships to justify its assertion of adjudicatory power.
Such congressional concern, however, is balanced by the need
to protect the rights of private claimants. 1 73 Moreover, the interests of private claimants endangered by the FSLIC's statutory interpretation are the precise rights that article III's
guarantee of an independent judiciary exists to protect. 174 Consequently, in light of the other factors indicating the need for
article III court adjudication of creditor claims, the FSLIC cannot save its interpretation by claiming congressional intent to
promote agency efficiency. 175 Although the FSLIC's concern
168. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
169. The Northern Pipeline Court noted that administrative agencies can
serve as fact-finding adjuncts to courts. When private rights are involved,
however, the scrutiny of such adjuncts is far stricter than when public rights
are at issue. Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
82-83 (1982). Indeed, the Court stated that article III courts must be afforded
an opportunity to determine the facts on the evidence when private rights are
at issue. Id. at 82 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932)); see also
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980) (upholding Magistrates Act
because findings subject to de novo review by district courts).
170. In Schor the Court found the adjudicatory scheme, which admittedly
involved private rights, constitutional because the claimants had the option of
bringing their claims in court. Commodity Futures Trading Comn'n v. Schor,
106 S. Ct. 3245, 3260 (1986). The FSLIC's scheme, in contrast, does not allow
claimants the option of a court suit, thus effectively replacing court adjudication with an agency determination.
171. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 112.
174. See Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3256. "[O]ur prior discussions of Article III,
§ l's guarantee of an independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of the United States intimated
that this guarantee serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests." Id.
175. It is important to note that in cases in which administrative agency adjudication has been upheld based on congressional intent to promote efficiency, the adjudication involved narrow questions related to the agency's
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for efficiency is valid, Congress can design a statutory scheme
that protects the rights of all the parties involved without violating the Constitution.
C.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Public policy considerations, although overlooked by the
Morrison-Knudsencourt, nevertheless reinforce the Ninth Circuit's decision and support the need for congressional clarification of the FSLIC's handling of creditor claims in its
receiverships. 176 The FSLIC in its capacity as insurer is usually
the largest claimant to the assets of its receiverships because
depositors subrogate their claims to the FSLIC when it pays deposit insurance. 177 Therefore, when the FSLIC in its receivership capacity adjudicates the rights of claimants to the
expertise. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 590 (1985) (holding that congressional intent to promote prompt registration of pesticides supported grant of adjudicatory power to Environmental
Protection Agency arbitrators in determining valuation of pesticide data);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932) (involving congressional intent to furnish expert and inexpensive agency determination of employer liability in
maritime accidents). The FSLIC's adjudication of creditor claims, in contrast,
involves a wide range of questions based on multiple aspects of state and federal law. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. Such claims, moreover, are unrelated to the FSLIC's regulatory expertise in managing thrift
institutions and providing thrift insurance. The FSLIC's claim of adjudicatory
power is thus similar to the broad grant of jurisdiction found unconstitutional
in the federal bankruptcy scheme. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
176. The Morrison-Knudsen court briefly examined the need for the
FSLIC to recoup its insurance payouts rapidly through prompt liquidation but
refused to "effect a wholesale revision of an agency's statutory authority in response to changed national conditions." Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216.
The court also stated that "the likelihood of FSLIC being a claimant... intensifies its interest in these cases" but failed to further develop the conflict of
interest problem. Id. (emphasis in original).
177. The Morrison-Knudsen court noted that the FSLIC is usually the
"single largest claimant" to the receivership assets. Id. at 1215-16. See 12
U.S.C. § 1729(b)(2) (1982) (payment of insurance on an insured account subrogates FSLIC with respect to claims on account); see also S. REP. No. 1263, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2530,
2531 (FSLIC typically has claim to at least 95% of assets of liquidated associations). In addition, receivers are ordinarily disinterested third parties who do
not have any claim against the receivership in their'personal capacity. See,
e.g., Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1946). The Phelan
court stated the general rule for avoiding conflict of interest through appointment of an impartial receiver.
Where a receiver has a possible personal interest adverse to those
of any parties to the receivership, it is usually unwise for him to participate in the reorganization; if he does so he must act with unusual
caution; that the court has acquiesced in his participating does not relieve him of his duty of disinterestedness.
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receivership assets, it creates a conflict of interest.178

Traditionally, receivers do not make claims against the receivership in their personal capacity. 179 In allowing the FSLIC
to make such claims, as it must to satisfy the claims it has in its
corporate capacity, the statutory scheme departs from the receivership model.' 8 0 Nevertheless, when the FSLIC performs
the ordinary receivership functions of liquidating and preserving the receivership assets for eventual distribution to claimants, including itself, its interest in maximizing those assets
accords with the interest of the other claimants. 18 ' When the
FSLIC decides with binding force which claimants have the
right to share in those assets, however, its interests and those of
other claimants directly conflict. 8 2 The FSLIC's current financial predicament with the pressure to relieve the strain on its
reserves could lead the FSLIC to prefer its own claims over
those of rival creditors' L8 3
Id. at 991.
The claim of the FSLIC in its capacity as insurer against the receivership
assets controlled by the FSLIC in its capacity as receiver is specifically contemplated by the statutory scheme. Nevertheless, creditors of defaulted savings and loan associations have alleged that the FSLIC's adjudication of
competing creditor claims creates a conflict of interest. See, ag., Finlay, Taking Spent Thrifts to Court, 7 CAL. LAw. 14, 14 (1987) (creditors challenge constitutionality of FSLIC conflict of interest); FSLIC as Federal Receiver Can
Adjudicate Claims Against Insolvent Savings Institution, 52 LEGAL BULL. 180,
183 (1986) (ruling may thrust FSLIC into conflict situation); Trigoboff, Ruling
May Change Rules for Suing FSLIC, 100 L.A. Daily J., June 22, 1987, at 5, col.
1 (creditors object to FSLIC conflict of interest); Cox, Savings and Loan Bar
Applauds Ninth CircuitRuling on Receiverships, 9 Nat'l L.J., Mar. 16, 1987, at
40, col. 1 (ruling resolves unseemly situation of FSLIC resolving claims of
other creditors).
178. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
180. The statutory scheme, however, contemplates only FSLIC preservation and liquidation of receivership assets, not adjudication of claims to those
assets. See supra notes 97-152 and accompanying text.
181. Congress granted the FSLIC receivership powers to facilitate preservation and liquidation of receivership assets with the intent to protect the
FSLIC's interest in the assets. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
Efficient preservation and liquidation of receivership assets also benefits the
remaining claimants, however, by yielding the largest possible amount of
money for distribution among all creditors.
182. The FSLIC and the other claimants are rival creditors, each competing for their share of the same pool of receivership assets. See supra note 177.
183. The FSLIC alleged authority to adjudicate creditor claims to recoup
its insurance payouts rapidly, thereby lessening the strain on its reserves. See
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. At least one court, when confronted
with the conflict of interest issue, summarily concluded that the FSLIC is presumed to act in the best interests of all claimants. See Baer v. Abel, 648 F.
Supp. 69, 78 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (belief that FSLIC's position as plaintiff would
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The FSLIC adds to the perception of unfairness in its adjudication by basing decisions on brief forms, without hearings or
subpoenas for production of documents.184 Claimants who receive little opportunity to provide supporting evidence for their
claims will consider a resulting denial unfair even without the
FSLIC's conflict of interest magnifying the problem. Moreover,
this perception of unfair adjudication encourages appeals that
the
further delay distribution of receivership assets, frustrating
185
FSLIC's goal of rapidly recouping its insurance payouts.
Arguably, the apparent unfairness of the FSLIC's adjudication constitutes a procedural due process violation. 18 6 One basic
component of due process, a hearing or other fair procedure to
determine the facts, is lacking. 87 In addition the FSLIC procedure lacks the impartial decisionmaker required for due pro88
cess because of the FSLIC's inherent conflict of interest.
undermine other plaintiff's position was speculative). The FSLIC's financial
pressures, however, cast doubt on such a presumption.
184. See, e.g., Finlay, sup'ra note 177, at 14 (FSLIC does not hold administrative hearings or publish opinions in receivership adjudications); Carrizosa,

supra note 19, at 1, col. 2 (FSLIC prohibits subpoenas of witnesses or
documents).
185. Even review under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA,
the review alleged appropriate by the FSLIC, grants claimants some measure
of protection against unfair adjudication. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text. Delays, such as those caused by appeals, frustrate the FSLIC's purpose of
recouping insurance payouts faster. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying
text.
186. Claimants of FSLIC receiverships have raised the conflict of interest
problem unsuccessfully in several cases as a procedural due process violation.
See, e.g., Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 78 (presumption that FSLIC acts in best interests of whole estate); First Am. Sav. Bank v. Westside Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
639 F. Supp. 93, 100 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (due process issue not ready for consideration until administrative procedure has produced injury).
187. The Supreme Court has established a balancing test to determine
which procedures satisfy due process in a given situation. The test requires
weighing the private interest involved together with the risk of an erroneous
deprivation against the governmental interest involved. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The private interest involved in creditor claims of
FSLIC receiverships is usually a substantial amount of money. An erroneous
determination could in some cases cause extreme financial hardship or bankruptcy. Governmental interest in maintaining efficiency, even given the
FSLIC's financial difficulties, weighs less heavily than the private interest. At
the very least, due process arguably requires that the FSLIC allow claimants
to submit substantial documentation for their claims instead of brief forms.
188. Decisionmakers who are personally biased do not meet the due process requirement of impartiality. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (holding that mayor acting as judge who imposed fines constituting substantial amount of village revenues did not satisfy impartial decisionmaker component of due process). For a discussion of the FSLIC's
impartiality, see infra note 190.
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Determining the procedures required to satisfy constitutional
due process is a complicated process, however, which renders a
comprehensive analysis of the possible due process violation beyond the scope of this Comment.189
Even if the FSLIC's adjudication of creditor claims does
not strictly violate due process, the apparent unfairness erodes
public confidence in FSLIC receiverships, an important policy
consideration. 190 Such an erosion of confidence could lead business people to be more cautious in dealing with savings and
189. Because the focus on statutory interpretation, violations of article III,
and public policy considerations are sufficient to establish the untenability of
the FSLIC's claim, due process analysis has been omitted in this Comment.
190. Numerous statutes guarantee the right to an impartial decisionmaker,
indicating congressional intent to preserve public confidence in government.
For example the federal ethics laws requiring disqualification of executive employees for personal interest, although applying only to situations involving
the employee's own pecuniary interest in the outcome of the administrative
determination, provide an analogy to the FSLIC's adjudication of rival creditor
claims. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1982) (executive personnel participation in
administrative adjudication involving financial interests of themselves, their
relations, or their organizations is a crime). The strength of congressional concern for maintaining unbiased decisions is evidenced in making the conflict of
interest a criminal act. The legislative history of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (financial disclosure provisions codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 & title 5 App. (1983 & Supp. IV 1987)),
which imposed financial disclosure requirements on government employees,
states that "[t]he purpose of this legislation is to preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of public officials and of the institutions of the Federal Government." S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216, 4217. The Senate Report elaborated on
the prophylactic goal of the Ethics Act.
[P]ublic confidence in all three branches of the Federal government
has been seriously eroded by the exposure, principally in the course of
the Watergate investigation, of corruption on the part of a few highlevel government officials. Public financial disclosure was seen as an
important step to take to help restore public confidence in the integrity of top government officials, and, therefore, in the government as
a whole.
Id. at 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS at 4237.
Although the Act applies to personal financial conflicts of interest on the part
of individual officials, the congressional intent to improve public confidence by
preventing conflicts of interest is clear. When an entire agency has a financial
interest, as in the FSLIC's case, the public perception of a conflict of interest
will be far more widespread and damaging than an isolated incident of conflict
of interest on the part of individual government officials. In addition the provisions of the APA dealing with personal bias further exemplify congressional
concern with agency impartiality by requiring that administrative employees
disqualify themselves if they are personally prejudiced toward one party. See
5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1982) (administrative employees should disqualify themselves from agency determination when personally biased). Given the FSLIC's
current financial predicament, it is naturally prejudiced toward its own pressing interests. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the
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loan associations, especially those experiencing difficulties,
thereby contributing to the failure of such institutions and the
subsequent drain on the FSLIC's assets.1 91 Such a drain is the
precise result the FSLIC seeks to avoid by adjudicating creditor
claims. 192 Consequently, Congress could better promote the
FSLIC's financial stability by providing an impartial adjudicatory scheme for creditor claims that balances the interests of all
concerned parties.
D.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The need for an impartial adjudicatory scheme to protect
the rights of all parties in FSLIC receiverships demonstrates
the need for legislative clarification beyond the exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement imposed by the MorrisonKnudsen court. 193 The exhaustion of administrative remedies
FSLIC's employees might also feel pressured by the FSLIC's precarious situation to favor their employer.
Statutes governing disqualification for judges provide another analogy, as
judges must disqualify themselves whenever claimants might reasonably question their impartiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982) (judge must disqualify self
"in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned");
see also CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon
3(C)(1) (amended 1982) (containing the "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" standard for judicial disqualification). The legislative history
states that Congress intended § 455(a) to "promote public confidence in the
impartiality of the judicial process." H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6351, 6355. Section 455(a)
thus further indicates that Congress intended to avoid the negative public image produced by conflicts of interest such as the FSLIC's. Because the FSLIC
is essentially adjudicating its own claims, claimants not only might but already
have questioned its impartiality. See supra note 177. The test for impartiality
is "whether a reasonable man might doubt the judge's impartiality." Comment, Disqualifcationof Federal Judgesfor Bias or Prejudice,46 U. CMI. L.
REV. 236, 248 (1978) (citing Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir.
1978)). Courts apply the impartiality standard from the point of view of a disinteiested observer, not a litigant. Id. at 251. Even though it is other claimants who have accused the FSLIC of partiality, a reasonable person, in light of
the FSLIC's large personal financial interest and pressing financial difficulties,
would most likely also question the FSLIC's impartiality.
191. Business people will, of course, always be cautious in dealing with
troubled institutions. Nevertheless, they can ordinarily count on the impartial
determinations of a court to protect their claims. Moreover, the FDIC does
not adjudicate creditor claims, but rather litigates such claims in court. See
supra note 91. The distinction between FDIC practice and FSLIC practice results in creditors of insolvent saving and loan associations being denied the
right of impartial adjudication accorded to creditors of insolvent FDIC-insured
institutions.
192. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. The effect of a court
compelling exhaustion of administrative remedies is the same as requiring ad-
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question, as noted by the court, is left to the discretion of district courts.194 This discretion allows significant variations of

result between similar claimants, which is especially problematic in view of the various ways courts in different circuits currently treat FSLIC receiverships. 195 Moreover, under the
Morrison-Knudsen court's solution, the FSLIC would be reof
quired to argue for exhaustion in each case, an inefficient use 196
both judicial resources and the assets of the receivership.
Furthermore, individual courts lack the authority to impose
procedural safeguards for the administrative determination
when ordering exhaustion of administrative remedies. 197 Consequently, new legislation is the best solution to the current
confused state of the law concerning FSLIC adjudication of
creditor claims.
To protect the interests of both the FSLIC and the creditors of its receiverships, the new legislation should provide for
a compulsory administrative hearing on disputed claims with an
independent administrative law judge' 98 or arbitrator. 199 The
ministrative adjudication with de novo court review, because courts usually
stay proceedings on a case rather than dismiss it when requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Nevertheless, the exhaustion requirement can result
in significant variations of treatment among similarly situated claimants. See
infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
'194. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. A court in the Fifth
Circuit, for example, would require creditor claimants to pursue the administrative process, while a court in the Ninth Circuit might, exercising its discretion, allow a claimant to bypass the administrative process. The MorrisonKnudsen court, of course, could not change current practice in the Fifth Circuit. A legislative solution, however, can guarantee a uniform procedure in all
circuits. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
196. In seeking to adjudicate creditor claims, the FSLIC attempts to recoup
its insurance payouts rapidly and lessen the strain on its reserves. See supra
notes 17-21 and accompanying text. Arguing for exhaustion in each case
would not only satisfy neither of these goals but would also be detrimental to
the claimants by increasing their litigation expenses and reducing the amount
of money available to satisfy successful claims.
197. Assuming a court required a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies, the claimant would be subject to the FSLIC's cursory claims procedure
with its concurrent conflict of interest. See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(4)(E) (1982) (providing a hearing for officers the FSLIC seeks to remove with a provision that the officers or their
representatives appear at the hearing). A similar provision for hearings with
an administrative law judge would effectively provide creditors an opportunity
to present their claims.
199. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Recapitalization Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 302, 101 Stat. 552, 585 (1987) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441), proposed the appointment of a panel of independent arbitrators with
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use of independent judges or arbitrators avoids the conflict of
interest problem. 200 Making the entire administrative process
mandatory gives the FSLIC the greatest opportunity possible to
determine which claims to allow. 20 1 In addition the statute

should provide detailed procedural guidelines, including the
right to subpoena witnesses and documents. 20 2 Review of the
administrative adjudication, however, should be de novo to
avoid an article III violation. 20 3 Although the suggested administrative adjudication procedure would be less efficient than the
FSLIC's present practice, the loss of efficiency is necessary to
prevent the erosion of public confidence caused by the FSLIC's
conflict of interest.20 4 The proposed legislation would thus replace the FSLIC's current summary adjudication of creditor
respect to the appraisal value of loans or property used as collateral for loans
held by associations, the classification of loans held by associations, and requirements of allowance for loan loss imposed on associations. As the committee noted, "[t]estimony was received in which there were allegations that in
some instances the [FHLBB] was overly aggressive and perhaps less than completely fair with some institutions, in its efforts to protect the FSLIC fund.
Such evidence is of concern to the Committee." H.R. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 38 (1987). A similar provision for either a single arbitrator or a panel
of arbitrators would avoid the perception of unfairness in FSLIC
determinations.
200. The FSLIC creates a significant conflict of interest when it adjudicates
the rights of rival creditors. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
201. Allowing the FSLIC the first chance to review creditor claims accords
with traditional receivership practice. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying
text. It also gives the FSLIC an opportunity to settle disputed claims, thereby
avoiding the significant drain on assets caused by protracted adjudication. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
202. This right is provided in traditional receiverships. See supra note 25.
This right is also provided in other statutes. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(h)(2)
(1983) (granting FSLIC power to issue subpoenas for both witnesses and documents in investigations of regulatory violations). The new regulations proposed by the FSLIC do not include this right, underlining the need for
congressional action to protect creditors' rights. See supra note 135.
203. Granting creditors of FSLIC receiverships de novo review of their
claims makes the proceeding similar to the Magistrates Act, upheld by the
Supreme Court in Raddatz, in which the magistrates' findings were subject to
de novo review. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980); see supra
note 169.
204. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
has held that a full administrative hearing is not necessary when de novo
court review is available. See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934)
(holding that administrative hearing was not required in tax collection case
when de novo court review was available before payment of tax). Nevertheless, allowing the FSLIC to continue its summary process would not solve the
conflict of interest problem. Moreover, court appeals are expensive to both
claimants and the receivership, making a summary adjudication process actually less efficient than a full administrative hearing.
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claims, including the accompanying constitutional violation and
conflict of interest problem, with a procedure that would constitutionally balance the rights of both parties and guarantee a
uniform process to all creditors of FSLIC receiverships.
CONCLUSION
Under current law the Morrison-Knudsencourt's refusal to
allow the FSLIC the right to adjudicate creditor claims is correct because the statutory authority does not support a grant of
adjudicative power. Moreover, the FSLIC's current adjudication procedure lacks sufficient safeguards to protect the rights
of the claimants, violates article III of the Constitution, and creates an undesirable conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the financial predicament of both the FSLIC and the thrift industry,
as the Morrison-Knudsen court realized in requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, makes some protection for the
FSLIC in adjudication of creditor claims advisable. Ideally,
however, that protection will consist of new legislation
designed to balance the competing interests of the FSLIC and
the creditor claimants because an exhaustion of remedies requirement does not provide a uniform result. The proposed
legislation would grant creditors the right to an administrative
hearing with an independent judge or arbitrator, including the
right to subpoena witnesses and documents, but it would make
the administrative process mandatory to provide the FSLIC the
opportunity to either allow or settle most claims. Judicial review would be de novo to avoid a constitutional violation. In
light of the current disparate treatment of similarly situtated
FSLIC-receivership creditors in different circuits, the new legislation is desperately needed to provide a uniform, comprehensive, and equitable solution.
Ruth E. Gaube

